For Immediate Release: July 14, 2005
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Steve Adamske,
202-225-7141 |
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REP. FRANK EXTENSION OF REMARKS ON THE WAGES OF
FAILURE ON WALL STREET
(Extension of Remarks - July 14, 2005)
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Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, one of the gravest weaknesses
in our financial system is the growing pattern of grossly excessive
compensation which the leaders of some major firms are paying themselves,
with the acquiescence of passive boards of directors. The issues raised by
the extraordinarily large pay packages some top executives are granting
themselves go beyond simply the inappropriateness of people enriching
themselves at the expense of their stockholders and their employees.
Increasing inequality in income distribution in this country has broader
policy implications, and there is also the growing problem of perverse
incentives that result from executives receiving grossly disproportionate
compensation based on decisions they themselves take. That is, it is clear
that some of the accounting abuses we have seen, and some decisions to
sell large companies to others are being influenced not by the basic
economics of these situations, but by the extent to which top
decision-makers personally profit from these decisions.
One of the most egregious recent examples is the $32 million payment
made to the co-president of Morgan Stanley, Stephen Crawford, for work of
only a few months as part of the upheaval that led to the ouster of Philip
Purcell. In the New York Times on Wednesday, July 13, there is an
excellent editorial on this subject, which notes that ``stockholders and
employees are properly seething at the deal cut for Mr. Crawford . . . by
a board that was oblivious to protecting the bank's reputation as it
over-rewarded his fealty to Philip Purcell . . .''
Mr. Speaker, I believe that this is a subject which Congress must
address. In particular, we must act to find ways to press boards of
directors to do more to safeguard stockholders and employees from
excessive compensation abuse, and we should in particular be looking at
ways to curb the extent to which these sorts of compensation schemes based
on various contingencies give perverse incentives to decision-makers. I
and others on the Financial Services Committee will be offering some
legislative proposals in this regard, and I offer the New York Times
editorial here for Members' edification as an example of why some action
is necessary in this regard. [From the New York Times, July 13, 2005]
THE WAGES OF FAILURE ON WALL STREET
Words like golden parachute hardly do justice to the stunning $32
million worth of a not-so-fond adieu engineered at Morgan Stanley, the
troubled Wall Street securities giant, for its departing co-president,
Stephen Crawford. Stockholders and employees are properly seething at the
deal cut for Mr. Crawford--after a mere three months on the job--by a
board that was oblivious to protecting the bank's reputation as it
over-rewarded his fealty to Philip Purcell, the chief executive who was
driven out in a messy power struggle last month.
The board majority appointed by Mr. Purcell opened the bidding on
failure's rewards by ushering Mr. Purcell to the exit with a $43 million
sweetener. Now others from his team of loyalists--sycophants is the term
outraged critics prefer--are lining up to walk the platinum plank behind
Mr. Crawford, who never ran a business division at the bank yet rose to
the top as Mr. Purcell's attentive protégé.
Mere groundlings juggling finances at their neighborhood A.T.M.'s must
pause slack-jawed at how Wall Street insiders are so ludicrously
compensated for plain failure at steering their companies. Few of life's
losers land so affluently.
The repair task now falls to John Mack, the new chief executive and
Morgan Stanley veteran. Facing a furor among stockholders and staff over
the severance machinations, Mr. Mack had second thoughts about his own
guaranteed salary of up to $25 million, so he is instead invoking a
merit-pay standard for himself. This amounts to innovation at Morgan
Stanley, where dozens of bankers, traders and managers quit when the
Purcell team ascended and ensconced their own in top positions even as the
bank lagged behind its competitors.
Mr. Mack is already seeking the return of the more respected departees
who ran profitable divisions. He has retained the other Purcell
co-president, Zoe Cruz; she was smart enough to turn down the board's
garish compensation package.
The new chief won't get far with recovery, however, unless he impresses
workers and investors with a fresh dedication to merit. That has to begin
with the departure of the current directors--on terms worth no more than
their true value in having compounded the turmoil at Morgan Stanley.
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and financial services sectors including banking, insurance, real estate, public
and assisted housing, and securities. The Committee continually reviews the laws
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the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Fannie Mae
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Act, the Truth In Lending Act, the Housing and Community Development Act, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the
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