

Views and Estimates of the Committee on Financial Services on Matters to be Set Forth in the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2017

Pursuant to applicable rules and laws, the Committee on Financial Services transmits to the Committee on the Budget the following views and estimates on matters within its jurisdiction or functions to be set forth in the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2017 (FY17).

OUR NATION’S FISCAL CHALLENGE

America is on a collision course with a fiscal crisis that will result in national insolvency, unless Congress and the President work together to get government spending under control. Yet since President Obama took office, a record \$8.3 trillion has been added to our nation’s debt, solely because Washington continues to spend money that we do not have. According to the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) latest estimates, over the next decade the federal government will run a \$9.4 trillion deficit; in fact, the nominal deficit will rise for the first time after six straight years of falling from its record peak dubiously achieved by President Obama and a Democrat-led Congress in 2009. Even if current law were to remain as it is today, CBO estimates that beyond the next 10 years, “the pressures that had contributed to rising deficits during the baseline period would accelerate and push debt up even more sharply.” That is unacceptable, unsustainable, and it will condemn Americans to a future of fewer opportunities, less economic freedom, and a lower standard of living.

Contrary to the self-congratulatory tone of President Obama’s recent State of the Union address, the truth is the American people are stuck in the slowest economic recovery of the last 70 years. Too many are still out of work; many of those who are fortunate to be employed are struggling with smaller paychecks. In fact, no modern presidency has been worse for average Americans’ incomes. After seven years of failed economic policies, middle-income families are actually earning less than they did in 2009, 13 million more Americans have become dependent on food stamps, and almost seven million Americans have fallen into poverty. It is not surprising, then, that despite President Obama’s rhetoric, the reality is that Americans are pessimistic and anxious not only about the state of the national economy but also their own personal economy.

Yet instead of trying to work with Congress to rein in spending and put our nation onto a sustainable fiscal path, President Obama’s idea of fiscal responsibility has been to simply call for more spending and higher taxes that grows Washington’s economy at the expense of the Main Street economy. Ending this culture of profligate spending – and the routine of blithely passing the bill for it on to our children – represents our nation’s fiscal challenge, and combatting it is our moral responsibility.

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3 **THE DODD-FRANK ACT**
4

5 **Regulatory Reform**

6 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), signed
7 into law on July 21, 2010, was the most sweeping overhaul of the regulatory structure of
8 our financial system in more than a generation. The Dodd-Frank Act made significant
9 changes to the federal regulatory regime covering banking, securities, insurance,
10 mortgages, systemic risk, and consumer protection, and mandated upwards of 400 separate
11 rulemakings, most of which missed their statutory deadlines for completion and many of
12 which have yet to be finalized.

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14 Funding Level: N.A.
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16 Committee's View: The Committee remains gravely concerned that the Dodd-Frank Act
17 has failed to achieve its proponents' stated goals of promoting the financial stability of the
18 United States, ending "too big to fail" and taxpayer bailouts, and protecting consumers from
19 abusive financial services practices. Instead, the Committee believes that the Dodd-Frank
20 Act has endangered taxpayers and our economy by enshrining "too big to fail" in statute,
21 creating endless new regulatory mandates from Washington that have resulted in fewer
22 and more expensive choices for consumers and small businesses, increased moral hazard in
23 markets by failing to address the true causes of the financial crisis, and hampered economic
24 growth. The Committee intends to advance legislative proposals to replace the failed
25 aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act with free-market alternatives that end bailouts once-and-for-
26 all, restore market discipline, ensure that the financial system is more resilient, pare back
27 unnecessary and burdensome regulations, encourage capital formation and economic
28 growth, and protect consumers by preserving financial independence and consumer choice.
29

30 **Orderly Liquidation Authority**

31 The Orderly Liquidation Authority, established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, gives
32 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) the authority to resolve non-bank
33 financial institutions whose failure government officials believe might pose a threat to the
34 financial stability of the United States.
35

36 Funding Level: N.A.
37

38 Committee's View: The Committee continues to have strong objections to the Dodd-Frank
39 Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority and the proposed manner in which such authority
40 would be implemented. Specifically, the Committee rejects the notion that taxpayers are
41 protected from future bailouts by the Orderly Liquidation Authority, under which the FDIC
42 may borrow from the Treasury to capitalize an "Orderly Liquidation Fund" to be used to

1 pay off the creditors of a failed firm. The Committee believes the Orderly Liquidation
2 Authority thus perpetuates the government guarantee enjoyed by creditors during the
3 recent financial crisis, which entrenched the “too big to fail” problem and placed taxpayers
4 on the hook for multi-billion dollar bailouts of large financial institutions. Accordingly, the
5 Committee supports replacing the Orderly Liquidation Authority with established
6 bankruptcy procedures, wherein shareholder and creditor claims are resolved pursuant to
7 the rule of law rather than the arbitrary discretion of regulators. Although the proponents
8 of the Orderly Liquidation Authority point to provisions in Title II which authorize the
9 FDIC to recoup costs from large financial institutions through *post hoc* assessments, CBO
10 has previously estimated that repealing Title II would achieve savings of \$22 billion
11 between fiscal years 2012 and 2022.

12 13 **Office of Financial Research**

14 The Office of Financial Research (OFR), established under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, is
15 an office housed within the Treasury Department that supports the Financial Stability
16 Oversight Council (FSOC) in fulfilling its duties of identifying and responding to risks and
17 emerging threats to the financial stability of the United States. Thus, the OFR collects
18 information and standardizes data for the FSOC and other financial regulatory agencies,
19 performs applied and long-term research, and develops tools for risk measurement and
20 monitoring.

21
22 Funding Level: The OFR is funded outside of the appropriations process through
23 assessments levied on large financial companies. According to its 2014 Annual Report, the
24 OFR’s estimated FY15 budget was \$99.5 million. The President’s Budget for FY16
25 anticipated that OFR would incur obligations of \$127 million for FY16, while noting that
26 the OFR estimated significant unobligated balances of \$83 million for FY15 and \$92 million
27 for FY16.

28
29 Committee’s View: The Committee remains concerned about the scope and potential for
30 misuse of the OFR’s powers as well as Congress’s limited oversight of the OFR and its
31 funding. Thus, the Committee will continue to pursue proposals to promote greater
32 accountability and taxpayer transparency for the OFR, including proposals to subject its
33 funding to the Congressional appropriations process. In 2015, the Committee favorably
34 reported H.R. 3738, the Office of Financial Research Accountability Act of 2015, which
35 would subject the OFR to a hybrid annual appropriations process under which it would
36 collect assessments to pay for expenses following congressional approval of the OFR’s
37 budget. The Committee also commends the inclusion of language in the FY16 Consolidated
38 Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) requiring the OFR to submit quarterly reports to the
39 Committee regarding its activities and budget and providing the Committee with the
40 opportunity to obtain the OFR’s testimony on these reports

1 **CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU**

2
3 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is a federal agency created by the
4 Dodd-Frank Act to regulate providers of credit and other consumer financial products and
5 services. The Dodd-Frank Act confers upon the CFPB Director a broad mandate that
6 includes consumer protection functions transferred from seven different federal agencies,
7 and the authority to write rules, supervise compliance, and enforce all consumer protection
8 laws and regulations other than those governing investment products regulated by the
9 Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

10
11 Funding Level: The CFPB does not receive appropriations; instead, it draws its funding
12 from a defined portion of the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, adjusted
13 annually for inflation. For FY16, by statute the CFPB may receive up to \$631.7 million.
14 The CFPB’s budget authority is further enhanced by unobligated balances brought forward
15 from prior fiscal years.

16
17 Committee's View: Although established within the Federal Reserve System, the Dodd-
18 Frank Act makes clear that the CFPB is an “independent bureau” and assigns no role to
19 Congress or the Federal Reserve System in overseeing its budget or use of funds. The effect
20 of the CFPB’s unorthodox budgetary treatment is that every dollar it draws directly
21 reduces the Federal Reserve System’s annual remittances to the Treasury, thus lowering
22 the amount by which such remittances may be used to decrease the federal deficit.

23
24 The Committee continues to believe that the CFPB’s structure and funding make it
25 uniquely unaccountable to the President, the Congress, and the American people. History
26 shows that agencies shielded from accountability are prone to abuse their authority, and
27 the CFPB is no exception. Accordingly, the Committee will continue to promote measures
28 that lead to greater transparency and accountability at the CFPB by considering legislation
29 to reform the CFPB’s operations and structure, including by subjecting the CFPB to
30 Congressional appropriations. In 2015, the Committee favorably reported H.R. 1266, the
31 Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2015, which would replace the CFPB’s director
32 with a bipartisan five-member commission, appointed by the President and confirmed by
33 the Senate, and urges its swift enactment.

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36 **SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

37
38 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) three-part mission is to protect investors,
39 maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. The SEC
40 staff and its five commissioners guide SEC policy by interpreting the Federal securities
41 laws, proposing new rules as warranted by market developments or Congressional
42 mandates, amending existing rules, and overseeing SEC enforcement actions.

1
2 Funding Level: \$1.605 billion in FY16 appropriations. By law, the SEC is required to fully
3 offset Congressional appropriations by adjusting its securities transaction fees so that its
4 funding is deficit-neutral. It also has the authority to carry over unspent funds from the
5 previous fiscal year; pursuant to this authority, it carried over \$51 million from FY15 to
6 FY16. The SEC can also spend up to \$75 million in FY16 from its Reserve Fund created
7 under Section 991 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Combined, the SEC's total spending authority
8 for FY16 is \$1.731 billion, \$9 million more than the Administration's FY16 request.

9
10 Committee's View: The Committee remains concerned that despite receiving significant
11 annual appropriations increases, the SEC has neither met statutory deadlines for the
12 issuance of rulemakings nor improved its annual examination rates for investment
13 advisers. Instead, the SEC has prioritized other objectives that are not central to its
14 mission. For example, the SEC has expended thousands of man-hours and tens of millions
15 of dollars in pursuit of Dodd-Frank Act mandates unrelated to the causes of the financial
16 crisis while its capital formation objectives languish. The Committee rejects the SEC's
17 assertion, made in connection with its preliminary request to the Office of Management and
18 Budget (OMB) for \$1.882 billion for FY17, that it is significantly underfunded; the SEC
19 should instead focus existing resources on fulfilling its three-part mission.

20
21 Additionally, the Committee continues to be concerned about both the SEC's ability to
22 carry-over unspent funds and the SEC's Reserve Fund. The Reserve Fund, which is
23 authorized to carry a balance of up to \$100 million (from which the FY16 Consolidated
24 Appropriations Act rescinded \$25 million for FY16), is supplemental funding that the SEC
25 can access without congressional approval; eliminating it would generate significant budget
26 savings for taxpayers. In 2016, the Committee will also seek to advance legislation to
27 reform the SEC's operations and structure. For example, in 2015, the Committee favorably
28 reported H.R. 3868, the Small Business Credit Availability Act, which would modernize the
29 regulatory regime for business development companies (BDCs). H.R. 3868 would fill a
30 lending vacuum and provide much-needed credit to small and middle market companies,
31 thereby generating economic growth.

32 33 34 **GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES**

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36 The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are
37 government-chartered public companies that purchase mortgages from lenders and package
38 them into mortgage-backed securities, which they guarantee and sell off to investors. The
39 GSEs have been in conservatorship under the auspices of their regulator, the Federal
40 Housing Finance Agency, since their financial collapse in September 2008.

41
42 Funding Level: N.A.

1
2 Committee's View: More than seven years have passed since the bursting of the housing
3 bubble and the GSEs' financial implosion, and the Committee remains extremely concerned
4 about the continued risk that the GSEs pose to taxpayers, especially through their
5 expanded activities and the further consolidation of their dominant market share. Despite
6 recent improvements to their corporate balance sheets, the GSEs' model is inherently
7 flawed and unsustainable without taxpayer support. Accordingly, the Committee continues
8 to support legislative initiatives to wind down the GSEs' operations, repeal their charters,
9 and replace their failed business model with a sustainable, private housing finance system
10 that protects taxpayers, enhances consumer choice in mortgage financing, encourages
11 private sector investment and innovation, and eliminates moral hazard. The CBO has
12 previously estimated that gradually winding down the GSEs would produce significant
13 taxpayer savings and decrease direct spending by almost \$6.7 billion over the next ten
14 years.

15
16 In the interim, the Committee urges Congress to adopt a realistic budget treatment of the
17 assets and liabilities of the GSEs. Doing so includes preventing the misuse of the proceeds
18 of the guarantee fees charged by the GSEs to investors; such funds are an important risk
19 mitigation tool to better protect the GSEs and taxpayers from future losses, and should not
20 be diverted to finance unrelated government programs or initiatives. Additionally, the
21 Committee strongly recommends that OMB move the GSEs to an "on budget" accounting
22 standard, as CBO has already done, to provide a more transparent accounting of their true
23 impact on the federal budget.

24 25 26 **FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM**

27
28 The Federal Reserve System, which serves as the nation's central bank, was created by
29 Congress in 1913. It performs several functions in our economy, and its Board of Governors
30 is responsible for supervising and regulating a variety of financial institutions and
31 activities, as well as conducting monetary policy pursuant to a statutory mandate to
32 "maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the
33 economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of
34 maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates."

35
36 Funding Level: N.A.

37
38 Committee's View:

39 The Committee remains concerned about the expanded regulatory mission of the Federal
40 Reserve and the inability of the Board of Governors to articulate clear guidance for how it
41 plans to conduct monetary policy. Over-reliance on the Federal Reserve to manage
42 virtually every aspect of the U.S. economy runs the risk of compromising the Fed's

1 independence and placing taxpayers at greater risk in the event that regulatory failure by
2 the Federal Reserve contributes to another significant or prolonged economic downturn.
3 Accordingly, the Committee supports legislation such as H.R. 3189, the Fed Oversight
4 Reform and Modernization Act of 2015, passed by the House in 2015 to strengthen the
5 Federal Reserve’s ability to achieve monetary policy outcomes consistent with its statutory
6 mandates, bring more transparency to the Federal Reserve’s efforts to achieve those
7 mandates, and protect the Federal Reserve from undue influence by the Executive Branch
8 in setting monetary policy. Although CBO has estimated that enacting H.R. 3189 would
9 reduce revenues by \$109 million over the 2016-2025 period by reducing the Federal
10 Reserve’s remittances to the Treasury, the Committee believes that achieving a more stable
11 and rules-based monetary policy would yield much larger benefits for taxpayers and our
12 entire economy.

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OUR OBLIGATION TO THOSE IN NEED

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17 Current federal housing policy is fractured, costly, and inefficient: the Government
18 Accountability Office found in 2012 that 20 different federal government entities
19 administer 160 programs, tax expenditures, and other tools that support homeownership
20 and rental housing.¹ In particular, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
21 (HUD) has received approximately \$1.655 trillion in real (2014) dollars in appropriations
22 over its 50 years of existence and today spends over \$45 billion annually on at least 85
23 active programs. Nevertheless, the national poverty rate has remained essentially
24 unchanged from 14.7 percent in 1966 to 14.8 percent in 2014.²

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Funding Level: \$42.842 billion in 2014 budget authority under OMB’s Subfunction 604:
Housing Assistance designation

29 Committee’s View: For all its good intentions, the federal government’s public policy
30 response to the very real housing needs of low and middle-income Americans has fallen far
31 short of success. Federal housing programs and policy are failing to keep pace with housing
32 need because they are not designed to address the root *cause* of housing need: the
33 underlying problem of generational poverty. It is simply insufficient to provide limited
34 subsidy dollars to those trapped in poverty and claim success for either the beneficiary of
35 such assistance or the taxpayers that have been asked to continue funding such efforts.

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Accordingly, the Committee believes we must reform and innovate how we provide
assistance for housing in the 21st century with a higher purpose than simply perpetuating

¹ Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-342SP, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and enhance Revenue pp. 186-194 (February 2012).

² Census Bureau, “Table 2. Poverty Status of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2014” (March 2015), available at <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/hstpov2.xls>

1 programs that ultimately warehouse and marginalize poor families and communities;
2 otherwise, this country will continue to fail the very people who are in the most need. In
3 2016 and beyond the Committee intends to consider transformative legislation to develop
4 new strategies to address housing need that are premised on fighting the root causes of
5 poverty and maximizing individual choice. The Committee will investigate more efficient
6 ways to deliver housing assistance within existing budget limitations with the goals of
7 helping people move from poverty to self-sufficiency, reforming HUD's mission and
8 streamlining its complex bureaucratic web of programs, and developing meaningful
9 innovations to assist communities and neighborhoods in spreading economic prosperity to
10 all. Additionally, the Committee believes we must evaluate public policies not by the good
11 intentions of their proponents but by the results they produce, and will work to develop
12 more meaningful metrics for programmatic success based on how many people are
13 graduated from federal assistance to economically self-sufficient lives.

16 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

18 **Mission and Modernization**

19 Established in 1965, HUD is a cabinet-level agency that has principal responsibility for
20 implementing and overseeing federal housing assistance programs. HUD administers a
21 wide variety of programs, such as rental assistance programs for lower-income families, the
22 Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) mortgage insurance programs, the Government
23 National Mortgage Association's (Ginnie Mae) mortgage-backed securities program, fair
24 housing programs, and programs that aid community and neighborhood development and
25 preservation.

26
27 Funding Level: \$47 billion in FY16 budget authority (This total does not include offsetting
28 receipts from FHA and Ginnie Mae, which lowered the congressionally appropriated cost
29 for funding HUD by roughly \$8 billion in FY16.)

30
31 Committee's View: Despite more than \$1.655 trillion in total lifetime appropriations, HUD
32 remains overly bureaucratic, fails to set priorities that define its mission, and does not
33 deliver measurable results. HUD retains 7,812 full-time employees across several
34 departments. The need for such a substantial workforce is not apparent in light of the fact
35 that nearly 80 percent of HUD's budget remains dedicated to administering three core
36 rental assistance programs – Tenant-Based Section 8, Project-Based Section 8 and Public
37 Housing – and because most HUD programs are renewal or formula-based. In fact, the
38 Congressional Research Service has estimated that 95 percent of HUD's FY15 discretionary
39 budget of \$45.3 billion was devoted to renewing contracts or providing grants through
40 existing formulae. HUD is also plagued by inefficient, outmoded programs and an inability
41 to spend appropriated funds in a timely manner, which results in huge backlogs of
42 unexpended taxpayer funds while the real needs of constituents go unmet.

1
2 The Committee believes that HUD is in need of an organizational overhaul and a
3 modernized mission to fight the root causes of poverty. HUD should be restructured to
4 optimize the alignment of its various divisions and consolidate overlapping and duplicative
5 programs, as well as to ensure the efficient utilization of its human capital. Such reforms
6 would both result in greater budget savings for taxpayers and allow for assistance to be
7 targeted to individuals with the most acute need.

8 9 **Section 8 Housing Assistance**

10 The Section 8 program provides housing assistance to over three million low-income
11 families and individuals each year through two elements: tenant-based rental assistance
12 and project-based rental assistance. Tenant-based rental assistance vouchers are portable
13 subsidies that low-income individuals can use to offset part of their rent in the private
14 market with any participating housing provider. By contrast, project-based rental
15 assistance is a subsidy attached to a unit of privately-owned housing that houses low-
16 income tenants; if the family moves, the subsidy remains with the unit of housing.

17
18 Funding Level: \$19.628 billion in FY16 appropriations for tenant-based Section 8
19 assistance and \$10.622 billion in FY16 appropriations for project-based Section 8 assistance

20
21 Committee's View: While changes to the voucher funding formula over the last decade have
22 increased voucher usage and efficiency, comprehensive reform is still needed. The
23 Committee believes that the public is better served not by expanding Section 8 but by
24 reforming the program to target need so that public housing authorities can serve more
25 people within existing funding levels. In 2016, the Committee will continue to consider
26 reforms to Section 8 and other assisted housing programs, including those contained within
27 H.R. 3700, the Housing Opportunity through Reform Act, in order to identify and
28 implement more efficient uses of taxpayer funds and to better help individuals achieve
29 greater self-sufficiency wherever possible.

30 31 **Public Housing**

32 Public housing is an affordable rental housing program that is administered by HUD in
33 conjunction with local-level public housing authorities, which are under contract to HUD
34 and own and manage public housing properties. HUD funds the roughly 1.2 million unit
35 program through two formula grants—the Public Housing Capital Fund and the Public
36 Housing Operating Fund.

37
38 Funding Level: \$6.275 billion in FY16 appropriations

39
40 Committee's View: Over the past two decades, despite the investment of tens of billions of
41 dollars in the development and maintenance of public housing units, the quality of such
42 units continues to deteriorate. The Committee recognizes that this trend is not sustainable

1 and that new approaches to public housing are necessary, including the implementation of
2 alternative means to finance affordable housing development. To make more capital
3 available to maintain and rehabilitate public housing, the Committee continues to support
4 the concept of the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. RAD permits public
5 housing authorities to partner with local developers, property owners, and nonprofit
6 organizations to preserve affordable housing units that would otherwise fall into disrepair,
7 become uninhabitable, and eventually leave the affordable housing stock. When
8 implemented properly, RAD could streamline HUD's rental assistance programs, increase
9 resident choice, and improve resident mobility.

11 **Native American Housing**

12 Federal grant and loan guarantee funding for housing assistance to Native American tribes
13 is primarily provided through the Native American Housing and Self-Determination Act
14 (NAHASDA).

16 Funding Level: \$650 million in FY16 appropriations

18 Committee's View: In 2015, the House passed H.R. 360, the Native American Housing
19 Assistance and Self-Determination Reauthorization Act of 2015, which, if enacted into law,
20 would strengthen taxpayer protections and tribal accountability within NAHASDA. H.R.
21 360 would give HUD the authority to recoup unexpended funds, allow tribes to pursue
22 alternative funding sources by encouraging private investment, and provide Native
23 American tribal governments with greater efficiencies when deploying NAHASDA funds.
24 In the 113th Congress, CBO estimated that legislation similar to H.R. 360 would not
25 increase direct spending or revenues. The Committee continues to support the goals of H.R.
26 360, and urges its swift enactment in 2016.

28 **Rural Housing**

29 The Rural Housing Service (RHS) is a federal agency housed in the Department of
30 Agriculture that provides direct loans, guaranteed loans, and grants to help low-to-
31 moderate income families obtain affordable housing in rural areas.

33 Funding Level: \$25.148 billion in FY16 total loan authorizations, including:

- 34 • Section 502 Single Family Guaranteed Loans: \$24 billion in FY16 loan authorizations
- 35 • Section 502 Single Family Direct Loans: \$900 million in FY16 loan authorizations
- 36 • Section 521 Rental Assistance: \$1.39 billion in FY16 loan authorizations
- 37 • Section 538 Multifamily Guaranteed Loans: \$150 million in FY16 loan authorizations
- 38 • Section 515 Multifamily Direct Loans: \$28.4 million in FY16 loan authorizations
- 39 • Section 542 Rural Voucher Assistance: \$15 million in FY16 loan authorizations

41 Committee's View: The Committee continues to monitor the RHS's stewardship of its
42 multifamily lending initiatives, especially the increasingly problematic interplay between

1 its Section 515 loan program to finance the construction of affordable multifamily housing
2 and its Section 521 Rental Assistance Grant Program under which owners may reduce the
3 rent burdens of tenants in such housing. Due to loan maturation and RHS's
4 mismanagement of its Section 515 portfolio, some lower-income tenants are now losing the
5 benefit of Section 521 rental assistance grants formerly made to their property's owner. As
6 a result, as many as 800 multifamily properties in FY16 ended up without sufficient rental
7 assistance to complete the fiscal year, creating a significant rental shortfall for which RHS
8 failed to budget; Congress was forced to address the shortfall in the FY16 Consolidated
9 Appropriations Act. An increasing number of Section 515 loans will soon reach maturity;
10 the Committee is concerned that the RHS may not be capable of managing the risks
11 associated with its multifamily lending initiatives and that the RHS will again experience a
12 rental assistance shortfall. Thus, the Committee intends to explore new ways to incentivize
13 private capital to develop affordable and workforce housing in rural areas to help avoid any
14 new funding crises with the RHS.

15 16 17 **FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION**

18
19 The FHA is an agency within HUD that insures private mortgage lenders against the risk
20 that borrowers might default on single-family or multi-family mortgages.

21
22 Funding Level: \$400 billion in FY16 single-family loan commitment authority

23
24 Committee's View: While noting that on November 16, 2015, the FHA achieved its 2
25 percent statutorily-required capital reserve ratio after violating the law for seven years, the
26 Committee remains concerned about FHA's expanded footprint in the marketplace and
27 more than \$1 trillion in mortgage credit risk. In fact, were it not for the FHA's volatile
28 reverse mortgage program, the FHA single-family loan portfolio would still be below the
29 required 2 percent threshold. For years, the Committee has cautioned the FHA about
30 attempting to grow its way out of its budget shortfalls instead of strengthening its
31 underwriting and capital requirements. To better protect taxpayers, the Committee will
32 continue to review the FHA's activities and consider various proposals to give the FHA a
33 more clearly defined mission in a sustainable housing finance system that complements,
34 not crowds out, a robust private mortgage market.

35 36 37 **NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM**

38
39 Created by Congress in 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides
40 federally-backstopped flood insurance to 5.3 million policyholders and over \$1.3 trillion in
41 insurance coverage. Currently, the NFIP has an outstanding debt of \$23 billion borrowed

1 from taxpayers, with \$7.425 billion remaining of its total temporary \$30.425 billion
2 Treasury borrowing authority.

3
4 Funding Level: N.A.

5
6 Committee's View: The Committee remains greatly concerned that there is little to no
7 private sector alternative to the NFIP, exposing taxpayers to virtually all of the nation's
8 insured flood risk. In 1968, Congress recognized that the inherent challenges of managing
9 flood risk were too great for the private sector and that no viable private sector insurance
10 alternative existed. But 47 years later, given the dynamics of the market and the
11 information now available, the Committee believes the biggest impediment to the
12 development of a private flood insurance market is the subsidized monopoly of the NFIP.
13 The Committee will explore legislative initiatives to facilitate the establishment of a private
14 flood insurance market that serves the needs of all Americans and reduces the significant
15 financial risk faced by taxpayers.

16 17 18 **EXPORT-IMPORT BANK**

19
20 The Export-Import Bank is an independent agency that provides taxpayer-backed export
21 financing through various loan, guarantee, and insurance programs.

22
23 Funding Level: \$106.25 million in FY16 appropriations for administrative expenses and \$6
24 million in FY16 appropriations for the Office of Inspector General

25
26 Committee's View: Given the Export-Import Bank's recent reauthorization through
27 September 30, 2019, the Committee will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of the
28 Bank's operations and governance to protect taxpayers from risk associated with the Bank's
29 operations, ensure the Bank complements rather than supplants the private market, and
30 eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse within or affecting the Bank. Additionally, the
31 Committee remains concerned that the application of government accounting standards
32 under the Federal Credit Reform Act fails to fully account for the risks borne by the Export-
33 Import Bank and supports the use of a more comprehensive accounting regime to
34 determine the Export-Import Bank's cost to taxpayers.

35 36 37 **MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS**

38
39 The multilateral development banks (MDBs) provide concessional lending and grants to the
40 world's poorest countries and engage in non-concessional lending to low and middle-income
41 creditworthy countries.

1 Funding Level:

- 2 • International Development Association: \$1.20 billion in FY16 appropriations
- 3 • International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: \$186.96 million in FY16
- 4 appropriations
- 5 • Inter-American Development Bank: \$102.02 million in FY16 appropriations
- 6 • Asian Development Bank (includes Asian Development Fund): \$110.59 million in FY16
- 7 appropriations
- 8 • African Development Bank (includes African Development Fund): \$209.79 million in
- 9 FY16 appropriations

10
11 Committee's View: In the past, the U.S. has determined the level of its support to MDBs
12 through pledges made by the Treasury Department on behalf of the U.S. to international
13 organizations, which are subsequently considered and funded by Congress through the
14 appropriations process. The Committee notes that, relative to Congress's willingness to
15 appropriate funds in support of the MDBs, the Administration has previously over-
16 committed the United States in pledges to such entities. Therefore, the Committee
17 recommends that the Administration refrain from making commitments that the U.S. is
18 not prepared to honor. The Committee urges Treasury to strongly advocate that
19 governments receiving assistance from the MDBs refrain from human rights abuses and
20 corrupt activities as a condition of continued funding. The Committee also believes that the
21 MDBs should undertake rigorous program evaluations to ensure that U.S. taxpayer
22 contributions are not squandered on ineffective initiatives.

23
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25 **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND**

26
27 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) seeks to ensure the stability of the international
28 monetary system and provides loans to countries that are experiencing actual or potential
29 balance of payment problems. The IMF also provides technical assistance to low- and
30 middle-income countries intended to help such countries effectively manage their financial
31 affairs.

32
33 Funding Level: Increase of U.S. quota in an amount equal to 40,871,800,000 Special
34 Drawing Rights. (Congress also rescinded an equivalent amount from the IMF's "New
35 Arrangements to Borrow" program, which is a set of credit arrangements between the IMF
36 and certain member countries used to supplement IMF quota resources for lending
37 purposes.)

38
39 Committee's View: The Committee will monitor the operations of the IMF's lending
40 programs to ensure that Treasury is managing risk effectively and securing the timely
41 repayment of taxpayer funds. The Committee urges the Administration to advocate for
42 greater fiscal discipline and budget transparency in countries borrowing from the IMF.

1
2
3 **FIGHTING THE FUNDING OF TERRORISM**
4

5 The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (OTFI) coordinates the Treasury
6 Department's efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, money laundering, and similar
7 financial crimes, principally through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the
8 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). As part of OTFI, OFAC administers
9 U.S. sanctions against drug traffickers, human rights abusers, and rogue nations, while
10 FinCEN receives, analyzes, and makes available to law enforcement data reported by
11 financial institutions on activities that potentially indicate violations of the law.
12

13 Funding Level: OTFI received \$117 million in FY16 appropriations and FinCEN received
14 \$113 million in FY16 appropriations
15

16 Committee's View: The Committee appreciates the importance of greater diligence in
17 fighting the funding of terrorism and other financial crimes in a global, increasingly digital
18 banking system. That is why the Committee empaneled its bipartisan Task Force to
19 Investigate Terrorism Financing in 2015, and again in 2016, to review the tools and policies
20 currently in place to spot and block the illegal flow of funds. Similarly, the effective use of
21 international financial sanctions remains an important tool for conducting diplomacy and
22 combating drug smuggling and human rights violations. Thus, the Committee supports
23 responsible efforts to enhance FinCEN's ability to meet the new challenges posed by the
24 growth of threats like ISIS, modernize the technology upon which OFAC relies, and enable
25 both agencies to hire and retain qualified analysts in a competitive workforce environment.
26 Additionally, the Committee believes that funding for the OTFI and OFAC should be split
27 off as separate accounts similar to FinCEN's, and hopes to work with the Committee on
28 Appropriations to enhance transparency on the government's efforts to fight the
29 international funding of illegal activity.
30
31

32 **ENSURING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL**
33

34 Federal agencies have undertaken several initiatives to promote greater economic
35 opportunity within the financial services sphere, including pursuant to Section 342 of the
36 Dodd-Frank Act, which established Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI)
37 within various federal regulators.
38

39 Funding Level: (varied)
40

41 Committee's View: The Financial Services Committee maintains an active interest in
42 promoting economic opportunity and increased participation for under-represented

1 populations in the financial services sphere, on both the workforce and supplier sides. The
2 Committee supports appropriate levels of funding for OMWI and other oversight efforts to
3 root out illegal discrimination, including discrimination that has been documented within
4 federal financial regulatory bureaus and agencies.